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Abstract: This paper empirically examines the income risks for Pacific Northwest apple growers, 
both conventional and organic.  Current yield based apple production insurance, the Growers 
Yield Certification (GYC), and hypothesized revenue based insurance are also examined for their 
risk management effect on growers.  Results show that organic apple production is more risky but 
has higher expected return than its conventional counterpart.  The current GYC is subsidized and 
subsidized more for organic growers.  However, the current low price selection levels prevent 
these programs from offering effective risk reducing effect, and they also prevent the hypothesized 
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PRODUCTION RISK AND CROP INSURANCE EFFECTIVENESS: ORGANIC VERSUS 
CONVENTIONAL APPLES 
 
I. INTRODUCTION   
Apples are a major crop in the Pacific Northwest (PNW) states (Washington, Idaho, and 
Oregon).    As the leading state of apple production since 1920s, Washington (WA) accounts for 
58.8% of total US apple production in 2005.    The value of apple production is $1.23 billion, 
representing 19 percent of total agricultural value produced in WA.    Oregon is also a major 
producer of apples, and it generates $26 million value of production accounting for 11 percent 
total value of production in Oregon State (NASS, 2006).    The value of apples production in 
Idaho was $12.5 million in 2005, ranking No.11 in the United States (US) apples production.   
The nutrient-rich soil, arid climate, plentiful water and advanced growing practices provide the 
right ingredients for producing top-quality apples in PNW region.     
      Due to health and environment concerns, a significant interest in organic apples production 
has developed over the last 10 to 15 years.    WA orchards produce about 35 percent of the 
organic apples in the U.S. and about 20 percent of the organic apples in the world (Schotzko and 
Granatstein).    The dry climate and ideal temperatures in central Washington reduce the number 
of disease and pest problems that can impact fruit and therefore reduces the need for applications 
to control insects and pests.    Certified Washington State organic apple acreage increased from 
well below 500 total acres in the late 1980s to 9,861 acres in 2002
1.    Most of the PNW organic 
acreage is planted in Red Delicious followed by Granny Smith, Gala, Golden Delicious, Fuji and 
so on.   3
PNW apples are primarily grown for the fresh market with a higher quality and higher value.   
PNW especially Washington’s quality standards for all apples are more stringent than grading 
standards used in any other growing region in the world.    This higher quality also requires 
higher production costs, which in turn results in high profit risks for apple growers, when couple 
with adverse weather conditions, insects and plant diseases, and other factors.    Apple crop 
insurance is a major risk management tool for apple growers.    However, compared with major 
field grain crops, the current apple crop insurance program is quite limited with only yield based 
contracts.    The basic choices include catastrophic coverage, higher coverage under Grower 
Yield Certification (GYC) which is a type of Multi Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) policy, and 
optional coverage for fresh fruit quality.   
        A frequent complaint made by PNW apple growers is that national insurance programs do 
not provide adequate coverage for high valued PNW fresh apples, and are even less adequate for 
organic apples.    The price selection level in GYC is set low compared to the fresh market price 
for PNW apples (4.65 $/box for Varietal B and 6.45 $/box for Varietal A).   The  yield  coverage 
level is also low, ranges only to 75%.    In 2000, USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
introduced a pilot coverage enhancement option (CEO) which was an option of increasing the 
coverage to 85%, but it was terminated recently.   
     An  extensive  amount  of  production-based  research has been done on risk management of 
organic farms.    Duram reported organic farmers were exposed in both production and price 
risks during the three-year transition period from conventional to organic production.    Hanson 
et. al. (1990) compared conventional and organic grain rotation during the first nine years of   4
production and found that the average annual profits of the conventional rotation were higher 
than the organic rotation without organic price premiums.    Reganold et. al. compared 
conventional, integrated pest management, and organic apple production systems.    Numerous 
studies have also been found on insurance programs for field crops such as wheat and barley (Ke 
and Wang; Wang, et. al.), corn and soybean (Sherrick, et. al.; Miranda and Glauber), and other 
field crops.    However, little work has been done specifically assessing both production and 
price risks for organic fruit growers.    Hansen et. al. (2004) indicated that most fruit and 
vegetable producers had little knowledge of crop insurance.    No other work has been found 
assessing the crop insurance program for tree fruits.     
Apples have many varieties for which production and price can differ markedly.  Currently, 
GYC insurance groups all apples only into two groups, varietal A and B.  Fuji, Gala and other 
newer varieties are in varietal A.  Red delicious, golden delicious and other traditional varieties 
are in varietal B.  This could limit the risk reducing effectiveness of the insurance. 
The goal of this paper is to assess income risks of WA apple growers and the risk 
management effectiveness of apple crop insurance programs.    Specifically, we will: (1) examine 
the income risks associated with conventional and organic production; (2) evaluate the roles of 
GYC for conventional and organic apples by variety; (3) evaluate presumed income based 
insurance (IP) and compare it with GYC.   
 
II. METHODOLOGY   
Income risks are represented by the distributions of growers’ income from production.     5
( 1 )                                 0 π PY C = −             
where π0 is the profit function from producing apples; P is the farm gate price after harvest
2, Y is 
the corresponding realized production level, and C is the deterministic cost of producing Y. 
  When growers have insurance, their profit function is specified as revenue generated from 
sales, yield or revenue insurance indemnities less production costs and subsidized insurance 
premiums: 
( 2 )                         0 ππ INS PRE SUB =+ − +                                            
the insurance income, INS, represents indemnity from GYC and the hypothetical IP as in the 
following:  
( 3 )                       ) , 0 max( 2 1 Y y x p x INS b GYC − =                             
( 4 )                       ) , 0 max( 2 1 PY y x p x INS b IP − =                        
where pb is the base price; x1 is the price selection level of the grower; and x2 is the GYC 
coverage level selected.    The setting for INSGYC is based on the actual GYC policy that growers 
can select a price level and a yield coverage level as a percentage of the established base price 
and Actual Production History (APH).    The APH is established as the projected yield at planting 
time, and here we use mean yield for APH.    The setting for INSIP is based on the current IP 
program for field crops, except that the base price level is set at the same level as GYC instead of 
futures market price.    PRE is the premium, calculated as both the actual premium currently set 
by RMA and the actuarially fair level for GYC, but only for the actuarially fair level for the IP; 
SUB is the RMA premium subsidy based on the current policy.   
The risk management decision is presumed to be made based on growers’ expected utilities.     6
We assume a representative apple grower chooses an insurance coverage level to maximize his 
or her expected utility of wealth, composed of a deterministic initial wealth, random production 
income and insurance transactions.     
( 5 )                      
12 , [() ]
xx MaxE U w , and  π + = 0 w w                                         
where E( ) is an expectation operator; U( ) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
representing the risk attitude of the decision maker; w is the stochastic terminal wealth; and w0 is 
an initial wealth level.     
Welfare effects of the insurance programs are evaluated by the Certainty Equivalent (CE) of 
the insurance, i.e., the certain amount of income paid to the grower for him to achieve the same 
expected utility without using the insurance as using the insurance. 
( 6 )                       00 () ( ) MaxEU w EU w CE = +π +          
        The grower is assumed to have constant relative risk aversion, which has been commonly 
used in a similar focus (Wang, et al; Coble, et. al.; Mahul).     
 
III. DATA AND SIMULTIONS     
        The empirical analysis is based on simulated risks faced by PNW apple production in crop 
year of 2006.    Historical data are used to estimate random price and yield distributions used in 
the  simulations.  Data  sources  are:  (1)  WA  Growers Clearing House (WAGCH) price data by 
variety, for both conventional and organic apples; (2) National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) aggregated state conventional yield data, long term but not by variety; (3) RMA farm 
level conventional APH records, not variety specific; (4) WAGCH conventional production data   7
by variety; (5) Washington Fruit Survey (1993, 2001, 2002) acreage data by variety; and (6) 
farm-level data from our own survey for organic apple growers in the Pacific Northwest 
including yield from 2000 to 2005 and production cost by variety.    The information from each 
source is combined together with reasonable assumptions to obtain farm level yields and prices 
by variety for both conventional and organic apple data. 
To be able to capture the weather-related yield risks, a long time series of historical yields is 
needed while accounting for time trends.    Several functional forms of time trends (linear, 
piecewise linear, quadratic, and loglinear) for the mean yield of conventional varietal apples are 
considered.    The analysis showed no trend for Red Delicious and Golden Delicious and a 
piecewise trend for Gala and Fuji.    For the organic varietal yields, no trend was considered 
based on limited recent six years data. 
The proper crop-yield distributions have been debated in the agricultural economics 
literature since the early 1970’s.    Several studies have agreed that crop yields are skewed 
(Babcock and Hennessy; Coble et al.; Borges and Thurman; Nelson and Preckel).    Some studies 
support positive skewness (Day) while others support negative skewness (Swinton and King; 
Ramirez).    A few non-normal distributions are proposed such as Beta (Borges and Thurman; 
Nelson and Preckel), Gamma (Gallagher), and log-normal (Jung and Ramezani).    Just and 
Weninger identify three common methodological problems in yield distribution analyses: use of 
aggregate yield data, inflexible trend modeling, and inappropriate interpretation of the Normality 
test results.    They shed doubt on the validity of previous findings of yield nonnormality and 
renew support for the normal distribution of crop yields.    Unfortunately, a consensus   8
specification for crop yield distributions has not been reached in the agricultural economics 
literature.    Thus this paper will use normal distribution to simulate the yields because: (1) the 
normality test of the residuals after time detrending can not be rejected; (2) there is no former 
work questioning the normality of apple yields; and (3) the multivariate joint normal distribution 
is well defined, which is convenient to simulate joint yield and price distribution with a 
correlation imposed. 
    Both  conventional  and  organic  varietal  prices are obtained from WAGCH.    Trends are 
identified and lognormal distributions are chosen to simulate the prices for 2006 against a few 
other candidate distributions.    An empirical distribution with 10,000 samples is simulated for 
each variety’s price and yield (See Appendix for details of the data process). 
The independently simulated yield and price distributions are converted into joint 
distributions using a linear transformation to impose the correlation structure estimated from the 
data.  The  conventional  yield-price  correlation  is about -0.6 for all varieties, and the organic 
correlations are about -0.7 with the exceptions for Fuji at -0.2.     
Per acre production cost for conventional apples for established trees are obtained from 
Schotzko and Granatstein.    The organic varietal costs are calculated as the average of the 
surveyed growers’ costs for each variety.
3    Production cost ranges from 4,000 to 5,000 $/acre 
for conventional and 4,500 to 7000 $/acre for organic apples.    The costs are assumed 
deterministic. 
In accordance with current GYC options, the maximum price selections are 4.65 $/box for 
Red Delicious and Golden Delicious and 6.45 $/box for Gala and Fuji.    The price selection   9
level can be chosen from 67% to 100%.    The yield selection level ranges from 50% up to 75% 
with 5% increment.    The current policy provides an aggressive base premium rate and a 
regressive subsidy rate based on the growers’ choice of yield coverage  levels.  The  rates  for 
base premium are 3.2%, 3.7%, 4.5%, 5.4%, 6.5% and 7.7% of liabilities and subsidy rates are 
67%, 64%, 64%, 59%, 59%, 55% corresponding to coverage levels of 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 
70% and 75%, respectively.    The organic apple premium is inflated by an optional organic 
factor of 1.05.     
    The  value  of  the  relative  risk aversion coefficient is set at θ = 2, which is based on previous 
research (Wang, Hanson and Black; Coble, Heifner and Zuniga; Pope and Just).  Thus  the  initial 
wealth (farm equity) for organic and conventional Red Delicious and Golden Delicious growers 
is 6,685 $/acre based on the debt/asset ratio for Washington farmers (17%, WASS) and the 
average WA apple orchard asset, 8,066 $/acre, including land value, the cost of irrigation system 
and tree value (Glover, et. al. ).    The initial wealth for Gala and Fuji is 8,803 $/acre since the 
trees value for those two is much higher than traditional varieties. 
 
IV. RESULTS   
The descriptive statistics of simulated varietal yields, prices and profits for both 
conventional and organic apples are shown in Table 1.    Organic apple growers have higher 
expected revenue and higher risks than conventional apple growers.  Among  conventional 
apples, the newer Gala and Fuji varieties have higher expected revenue and lower risk than Red 
Delicious and Golden Delicious.    This may explain why Gala and Fuji have increased their   10
market shares dramatically in recent years.    Organic Fuji has the highest expected revenue and 
risk among all the organic varieties.    Different from conventional Gala apples, organic Gala has 
lower risk (standard deviation) and also lower expected revenue than both organic Fuji and 
organic Golden Delicious.   
Besides the benchmark case of no insurance, six other scenarios are investigated for each of 
conventional and organic varieties.    GYC under current policy premium rates, GYC under 
actuarially fair premium rates, and hypothesized IP under actuarially fair premium rates, all of 
which have two cases of with and without USDA subsidies.    These scenarios allow us to 
compare: (1) GYC and IP at a similar basis (actuarially fairness); (2) the effect of insurance on 
conventional and organic apples; (3) insurance influence by varieties.  The  optimization  results 
are shown through Tables 2 to 5. 
Sensitivity analysis of risk aversion level is also conducted.    We examine the risk aversion 
levels from 1.5 to 3 with 0.5 increments.    The rankings of insurance programs in all the 
comparisons do not change except the values of CE increase as the risk aversion level goes up. 
GYC vs IP 
The optimization results show that both GYC and hypothesized IP provide risk protection to 
the farmer as shown by reduction in the standard deviation of profit for most insurance options.   
Both conventional and organic growers will choose full coverage in most cases.    The exceptions 
will be discussed later in varieties comparison.    As expected, the grower has a higher welfare as 
measured by certainty equivalent (CE) and pays lower premium with subsidy than without 
subsidy for both GYC and hypothesized IP programs.     11
The hypothesized IP gives the conventional Red Delicious grower higher protection (less 
risk as measured by standard deviation of profit) and higher welfare (CE) than GYC program, 
although the grower pays more premium.    This is because both their production and marketing 
risks are protected by IP which results in receiving a higher indemnity and a higher government 
subsidy.   
Different to conventional Red Delicious apples, the income protection gives less risk 
protection for all the other apple growers than GYC.  This  is  because  that price selection (4.65 
$/box for Red Delicious and Golden Delicious and 6.45 $/box for Gala and Fuji) in the current 
GYC programs is too low compared to the market cash price, especially for organic apples.    For 
example, the expected market price for organic Red Delicious is 9.27 $/box and 13.55 $/box for 
Gala.    It’s more difficult to get indemnity from IP than GYC program even when yields are low 
because the price is often considered “high” based on the price selection levels and no revenue 
loss is observed.    The expected market price for conventional Red Delicious is only 4.37 $/box, 
which is lower than the price selection.    In that case, IP provides better protection than GYC. 
However, from the point of view of the premium paid by the grower and government 
investment in premium subsidy, hypothesized revenue insurance, IP, is more cost effective for 
both conventional and organic practices.    For example, the per dollar subsidy investment will 
bring a $4.21 welfare gain by GYC and $9.34 welfare gain by IP under actuarially fair premium 
structures for organic Red Delicious.    The per dollar grower investment in insurance (premium 
paid) will gain $5.14 welfare by GYC and $11.41 by IP under the same scenario.    Notice, the 
$0.61 welfare gain brought by each dollar of government subsidy in conventional GYC suggests   12
that it would be more economic for the government to give the $1 directly to growers instead of 
subsidizing the GYC program. 
Conventional vs Organic 
The organic apple grower’s income risk is reduced more dramatically by insurance than 
conventional grower.    For example, the standard deviation reduction of profit ranges from 0 
(GYC without subsidy) to 239.07 (IP) for the conventional Red Delicious grower and from 
288.27 (IP) to 662.87 (GYC) for the organic grower when insurance is used.    Consequently, the 
organic apple grower’s welfare gain from insurance is higher than that of the conventional 
grower although he has to pay much higher premium for GYC than the conventional grower so 
as to reduce more risks.     
The conventional grower is better off (higher CE and less premium) when the insurance is 
actuarially fair than when the premium is set as in the current policy.    This implies a loading 
exists in the current premium rates.     
However, the organic grower pays higher premium and is less willing to pay for GYC when 
the premium is actuarially fair than set by current policy except for Gala apples.    The reason is 
that the organic apple production risks are so high based on our survey, that the current GYC 
premium is set below the expected indemnity even after the organic premium is inflated by 5 
percent in the policy.    This is also why in our scenario of current GYC without subsidy the 
grower still chooses the highest coverage level.    Although the insurance price is quite low 
compared to the market organic apple prices, organic growers still benefit more than their 
conventional counterpart from the GYC.    The organic inflation factor needs to be increased so   13
as to make the insurance actuarially fair. 
Red Delicious vs Golden Delicious vs Gala vs Fuji 
The optimization results in Table 2 for Red Delicious show that both conventional and 
organic growers choose full coverage in all cases except GYC without the subsidy for 
conventional apples.    In this case, the grower does not choose insurance because the current 
premium is too high relative to his/her risks and no subsidy is provided.     
When the premium is higher than the actuarially fair level and no subsidy, the conventional 
Golden Delicious grower chooses not to buy insurance (See Table 3).    When subsidy is added, 
the grower chooses full yield coverage and a reduced price selection level  at  92%.  The  Golden 
Delicious grower chooses full coverage in all other cases. 
        As for Gala, the conventional grower is not interested in current GYC or hypothesized IP 
either with or without subsidies based on Table 4.    The conventional grower chooses insurance 
only for actuarially fair GYC, but this plan does not provide much value to him either.    Thus 
both GYC and IP are not effective in reducing the risk for conventional Gala growers.    The 
price selection and yield coverage are too low to provide significant  protection.  Or,  this 
grower’s risk is not high enough for him/her to benefit from the insurance as shown by the 
coefficients of variation (CV) in Table 1. 
GYC and hypothesized IP can protect organic Gala growers from risk.    The grower 
chooses full coverage in all cases except when current premium is high without subsidy for GYC.       
If the subsidy is removed from the current GYC, the organic grower will reduce their insurance 
level from maximum to minimum (67% price selection level and 55% coverage level).       14
Different from other organic varieties, the organic Gala grower pays less premium and is 
more willing to pay for GYC when the premium is actuarially fair than set by current policy.   
This means the GYC premium for organic Gala is set above the expected indemnity, which is a 
normal practice.    The reason that organic Gala is an exception is that Gala production risk is 
much lower than the other organic apples and thus reduces the expected indemnity.   
According to Table 5, the current GYC is not beneficial to the conventional Fuji grower 
with or without subsidy because the premium is set too high relative to the grower’s risk.    The 
conventional grower chooses full coverage in all other cases.    However, the conventional 
grower does not receive much protection from insurance in any of these cases.    The organic Fuji 
grower is much more willing to pay for insurance since it exhibits the highest profit risk of all 
varieties (Table 1).    Although the yield risk is lower than for both Red Delicious and Golden 
Delicious, the low price and yield correlation for organic Fuji apples makes its income highly 
risky.    This makes the insurance value for organic growers the second highest following Red 
Delicious among all varieties.     
   
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
PNW, especially the state of Washington, is the leading region in both conventional and 
organic apple production.    PNW apples are primarily grown for the high value fresh market due 
to their high quality.    Multiple perils (production cost) and market fluctuation (price risk) results 
in revenue risk.    Crop insurance is a major risk management tool for apple growers.    The 
current apple insurance program offers only a yield based program.    Both price selection and   15
coverage level are set very low to provide adequate protection.    In this paper, we examined the 
income risks associated with conventional and organic production and evaluated the roles of 
GYC and hypothesized IP insurance schemes for conventional and organic apples by variety.   
Results show organic apple growers earn higher expected revenue, incur higher production 
cost (excluding establishment cost), make higher expected profit, but face higher income risks 
than conventional apple growers.     
We assume the apple grower makes decisions on insurance coverage and price election 
levels to maximize expected utility of after harvest wealth, composed of initial wealth, random 
production income and insurance transactions.    Results show, in terms of certainty equivalent, 
that income insurance is not necessarily preferable than yield insurance by growers if the prices 
selection is set at the same level as in the current GYC programs, because it is too low compared 
to the market cash price.    Only conventional Red Delicious growers will benefit from IP more 
than GYC under comparable premium subsidy structures since the base selection is very close to 
Red Delicious market price.    From the point of view of the government investment in premium 
subsidies, revenue insurance is always more cost effective for all varieties and for both 
conventional and organic practices. 
The conventional apple growers’ welfare gain from the current insurance is less than the 
organic growers because their income risk is lower.    Organic apple production risks are higher 
than their conventional counterparts’, causing the current GYC premium to be below the 
expected indemnity even before the subsidy and after the organic premium inflation factor 
(except Gala) based on our survey data.    Although the insured price is quite low compared to   16
the organic market prices, organic growers still benefit more than their conventional counterparts 
from the GYC.    This doesn’t mean that we should not consider increasing organic apple price 
selection level to give growers more protection.    Currently, the low price selection and low 
premium setting do not provide enough indemnity when losses occur, although the higher 
subsidy provides a higher risk free income at all times, and thus reduce its risk reduction value.   
Gala apple production is less risky for both conventional and organic apple growers. 
Consequently, Galas benefit little from insurance and organic Gala becomes an exception from 
the other organic varieties, namely, the current GYC premium is above the expected indemnity.   
In the future insurance parameter setting, it would be good to separate at least Gala from the 
other varieties.    This implies that the current Varietal A and B categorization is not accurate 
enough to assess a fair premium structure for apple growers which may cause adverse selection 
problems. 
    The results depend heavily on the simulated distribution.    Our organic grower survey 
sample is small, and the organic results can be more reliable only when more grower production 
records are available in the future.     17
ENDNOTES  
12002 estimated figures from Washington State University Center for Sustaining Agriculture and 
Natural Resources. 
2Apples are sent to packing house after harvested, and then sorted, stored, packed and marketed 
to retailers year round.    The growers usually receive the payment from the packing house based 
on the average price over the crop year less a packing house cost.    Therefore, the price is 
stochastic until way after the harvesting time. 
3Both costs do not include establishment cost.    There is a large amount of establishment cost in 
the first few years of new trees.    These costs are usually amortized into later years when the 
trees get matured, so that the profit levels would be greatly reduced.    However, we don’t find 
this information by variety and by conventional/organic practice.  18
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Simulated Varietal Conventional and Organic Yields, Prices and Revenues 
                Conventional                                        O r g a n i c                      
Variable  Mean StDev CV Min  Max  Skewness Mean  StDev CV  Min Max  Skewness 
                                      
Yield                        
Red Delicious  902.23  278.32  0.31 0  1958.21  0.04  1139.8  518.6  0.45 0  3224.4  0.12 
Golden Delicious  1032.9  269.7  0.26 48.5  2050.7  0.06  1067.3  449.2  0.42 0  2845.3  0.07 
Gala 929.52  103.7  0.11 523.76  1364.67  0.03  744.24  209.67  0.28 0  1615.47  -0.01 
Fuji   832.16  200.74  0.24 83.87  1640.3  0  1000.7  404.8  0.4  0  2431.6  0.03 
                        
Price                        
Red Delicious  4.37 1.57  0.36 1.1  16.74  1.09  9.27  2.32  0.25 3.75 22.83  0.76 
Golden Delicious  6.22  2.04  0.33 1.82  20.04  0.99  11.77  3.94  0.33 3.5  37.77  0.96 
Gala 9.25  1.71  0.18 4.5  18.04  0.52  13.55  2.94  0.22 5.84 27.9  0.66 
Fuji   10  2.56  0.26 3.69  25.08  0.8  13.58  3.25  0.24 4.61 38.53  0.76 
                        
Revenue                        
Red Delicious  3712  1232.9  0.33 0  10378.5  0.74  9645.8  3404.2  0.35 0  21261.9  -0.45 
Golden Delicious  6112.5  1756.6  0.29 727  18181.3  0.74  11237  3624  0.32 0  26093  -0.16 
Gala 8501.3  1292.7  0.15 5042.5  14087.5  0.43  9704.6  2311.8  0.24 0  21247.5  0.09 
Fuji   7890.2  1124.1  0.14 1753.7  12910.7  0.12  13319  5889  0.44 0  43335  0.5 
                                       
 




Table 2. Optimization Results for Red Delicious Apple 
Profit  









                             
Conventional                  
No insurance  6487.00  1232.85              
GYC 6529.21  1135.70 81.77  1.00  0.75  109.03  0.75  133.26  0.61 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  6487.00  1232.85 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  6570.18 1135.70 122.43  1.00  0.75  68.06  1.80  83.18  1.47 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  6487.00 1135.70 39.87  1.00  0.75  151.24  0.26  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  6610.23 993.78 213.99  1.00  0.75  100.83  2.12  123.23  1.74 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  6487.00 993.78  92.80  1.00  0.75  224.06  0.41  0.00  N/A 
                  
Organic                    
No insurance  11373.68 3404.19              
GYC 11669.21 2741.32 1064.03 1.00  0.75  144.62  7.36  176.75  6.02 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  11492.45 2741.32 915.33  1.00  0.75  321.37  2.85  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  11615.76 2741.32 1018.86 1.00 0.75  198.06  5.14  242.08  4.21 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  11373.68 2741.32 816.56 1.00  0.75  440.14  1.86  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  11444.87 3115.92 664.76 1.00  0.75  58.25  11.41  71.19  9.34 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  11373.68 3115.92 605.28 1.00  0.75  129.44  4.68  0.00  N/A 




Table 3. Optimization Results for Golden Delicious Apple 
Profit  









                     
Conventional                  
No insurance  8697.47  1756.58              
GYC 8683.43  1687.57 18.20  0.92  0.75  114.83  0.16  140.35  0.13 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  8697.47  1756.58 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  8757.72  1684.09 93.24 1.00  0.75  49.30  1.89  60.25 1.55 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  8697.47 1684.09 33.28  1.00  0.75  109.55  0.30  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  8710.16  1717.20 37.89 1.00  0.75  10.38  3.65  12.69 2.99 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  8697.47 1717.20 25.26  1.00  0.75  23.08  1.09  0.00  N/A 
                  
Organic                    
No insurance  13334.29 3623.67              
GYC 13556.31 3137.56 800.41  1.00  0.75  135.42  5.91  165.52  4.84 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  13390.79 3137.56 655.25  1.00  0.75  300.94  2.18  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  13530.88 3137.56 778.02 1.00  0.75  160.85  4.84  196.59 3.96 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  13334.29 3137.56 606.04 1.00  0.75  357.44  1.70  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  13366.75 3473.45 423.96 1.00  0.75  26.56  15.96  32.46 13.06 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  13334.29 3473.45 395.42 1.00  0.75  59.02  6.70  0.00  N/A 




Table 4. Optimization Results for Gala Apple   
Profit  









                     
Conventional                  
No insurance  10156.33 1292.74              
GYC 10156.33 1292.74 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  10156.33 1292.74 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  10157.82 1291.52 1.81 1.00  0.75  1.22  1.48  1.49  1.21 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  10156.33 1291.52 0.32 1.00  0.75  2.72  0.12  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  10156.33 1292.74 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  10156.33 1292.74 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
                  
Organic                    
No insurance  11738.63 2311.77              
GYC 11747.36 2112.44 142.52  1.00  0.75  130.99  1.09  160.09  0.89 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  11692.17 2263.74 7.28  0.67  0.55  68.72  0.11  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  11815.48 2112.44 208.90 1.00  0.75  62.87  3.32  76.85  2.72 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  11738.63 2112.44 134.01 1.00  0.75  139.72  0.96  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  11742.10 2292.07 40.04 1.00  0.75  2.84  14.09  3.47  11.52 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  11738.63 2292.07 36.61 1.00  0.75  6.32  5.80  0.00  N/A 





Table 5. Optimization Results for Fuji Apple 
Profit  









                     
Conventional                 
No insurance  9790.18  1124.14              
GYC 9790.18  1124.14 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  9790.18  1124.14 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  N/A  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  9845.31  1037.71 78.93 1.00  0.75  45.10  1.75  55.12  1.43 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  9790.18 1037.71 23.99  1.00  0.75  100.23  0.24  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  9790.63 1120.80 2.51  1.00  0.75  0.37  6.77  0.45  5.54 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  9790.18 1120.80 2.05  1.00  0.75  0.82  2.49  0.00  N/A 
                  
Organic                    
No insurance  15110.17 5889.15              
GYC 15294.42 5479.92 909.20  1.00  0.75  126.97  7.16  155.18  5.86 
GYC (W/O subsidy)  15139.24 5479.92 775.65  1.00  0.75  282.15  2.75  0.00  N/A 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  15281.34 5479.92 897.89 1.00  0.75  140.05  6.41  171.17  5.25 
GYC (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  15110.17 5479.92 750.79 1.00  0.75  311.22  2.41  0.00  N/A 
IP (Actuarially fair,W subsidy)  15177.85 5673.25 676.69 1.00  0.75  55.38  12.22  67.68  10.00 
IP (Actuarially fair,W/O subsidy)  15110.17 5673.25 618.95 1.00  0.75  123.06  5.03  0.00  N/A 






Appendix: Yield, Price and Income Risk Simulation for PNW Apple Growers 
        We have explored four sources of data available for the apple risk research.    First is 
the NASS published data.    Second is APH RMA records.    Third is the WA Clearing 
House data.    The last one will be from our own survey.    They each have advantages 
and disadvantages in terms of representing the risks as listed in the following table.   
 NASS  RMA  Clearing  House  Survey 
Period    >30 years  24 years  4 years  5 year 
By variety  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Aggregation  State level  Farm level  State level  Farm level 
Organic/Conventional mixed  mixed  Separated Organic  only 
 
        Ideally, to analyze the income risks of an apple grower, we will need farm level data, 
by variety, by grade/size category because they are sold at different prices, by 
conventional or organic practice, and longer period so as to represent the production risk 
caused by weather.    Some bad weather might have not appeared in recent four or five 
years.    However, from the above table we see that there is no one source that can satisfy 
all the research needs.    The information from each source is combined together with 
reasonable assumptions to obtain farm level yields and prices by variety for both 
conventional and organic apple data. 
1. Yield, Price and Income Simulation for Conventional Apples   
        We first need to estimate the model parameters, and simulation can be easily carried 
in computer software based on the parameters.    We first identify the long term trend 
using NASS data, and examine the detrended residual yield distribution.    The test 
statistic of Shapiro-Wilk normality test for the residuals is 0.96, which means we cannot 
reject that the residual of the yield following a normal distribution.    Because we will 
need the farm yield which may have a higher risk than the state level, we turn to RMA  
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data.    Assuming they follow the same trend because of the same technical development, 
we can measure the farm level yield distribution and calculate the farm level variance.     
        Clearing House data is the only source with output quantity by variety.    We use 
these data as a proxy to the total WA state output of each variety excluding cull.    Based 
on an average state cull rate, we converted the packed output into total output including 
culls.   Then  based  on  the  two  Washington  Fruit Surveys in January 1993 and 2001, and 
the by variety acreages changes for the years after, we estimated the acreage for each year 
for each variety, and use them to divide the total output to get yield by variety.    These 
yields by variety are estimated based on many assumptions, with about ten years of data, 
and are at state level.    With these yields, we can estimate the trends of each variety, 
detrend them, and estimate the distributions.    We then convert the state level by variety 
distributions into farm level by simply enlarging their variances while maintain all other 
distributional parameters at the state level.    We follow the same variance ratios between 
state and farm from the above all variety samples in this conversion of by variety samples.   
These farm level yield distribution by variety estimations can be used in simulation. 
        It is relatively easier to estimate the price distribution because prices are at the state 
level and individual farms face the same prices.  First,  the  Clearing  House  website 
provides the average by variety FOB data for over ten years.    Specifically, Reds and 
Goldens: 1980-2004, Granny Smith: 1984-2004, and Gala and Fuji: 1991-2004.    The 
FOB prices are then converted into farm gate prices by subtracting the warehouse cost.     
Again, trends are identified and lognormal distributions are adopted after refutable tests.   
        The correlations between the yield of all varietal apples and their prices are 
estimated from the historical data.    A negative correlation is identified for the  
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established varieties because of the market supply demand relationships.    The 
correlation is then imposed in the joint price-yield simulation.    The growers per acre 
revenue distribution can be calculated by the price times the yields, under the assumption 
of all apples are sold at an average market price.     
2. Yield, Price and Income Simulation for Organic Apples   
        A survey on organic apple growers in the PNW was conducted by Washington State 
University and University of Idaho.    We have Red Delicious, Golden Delicious, Fuji, 
Gala, Braeburn, and Granny Smith apples in our survey with a total of 118 observations 
for 33 farms for 6 years (2000-2005).    Although the number of farms is not large, it has 
a good representability given the whole population of PNW growers with no less than 
five acres of organic apples is very small.    We only keep the first four varieties because 
the others have only one or two farms with multiple years of yield records which are not 
enough for risk analysis purposes. 
  No trend is modeled because we believe that the conventional long term trend 
does not represent the organic technology, and the six years of farm data is not long 
enough to model the trend.    As a result, we average the annual yields to represent the 
expected yield for each variety by farm, and the sample standard deviations is also used 
to represent the yield risks for each variety by farm.    Then, the averages and standard 
deviations of all the farm yield are used as the representative farm’s expected yield and 
standard deviation.    Following the same normal distributions of conventional yields, 
10,000 random yields are simulated for each variety representing the upcoming crop year 
2006. 
The organic FOB price data (1998-2004) is found from the WA Growers Clearing  
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House (WAGCH) website, the same place as conventional apple.    Following the same 
procedure as in the conventional price estimations, a lognormal model is used and 10,000 
random prices are simulated for each variety. 
The price-yield correlations are calculated based on the WAGCH and survey data 
over years 2000 through 2004, during which both price and yield have observations.    A 
joint price-yield distribution is then obtained from a linear transformation of the 
independently simulated price and yield distributions.    The revenue distribution from 
growing each variety of apples is obtained by multiplying the prices and yields in the 
joint distribution.   
 
 
 
 